Abstract:
Arguments claiming to demonstrate the existence of God come in many varieties and levels of sophistication.
Not surprisingly, the theist believes these arguments are clear demonstrations which underwrite
a life devoted to worship, while the atheist, in contrast, skeptically begs to disagree. How is it that the
soundness of the same argument is judged so differently? By what reasonable standard may these arguments be
judged to be successful or not? This article examines this issue and makes the case that the stringency of
the standard must be commensurate with the immediate and patent costs of getting it wrong.
Consider the following sets of statements:
I feel that most would agree without much argument that these statements possess some diminishing level of certainty as we move from set 1 along to set 7. Some may be perplexed by 1 b until they note that these statements are most certainly false; hence, they still possess great certainty but in their falsehood.
The groupings also exhibit some coherent pattern within each set. We start in set 1 a with commonly held facts about the world whose truth is amply supported by evidence and confirmation and also in b we have assertions to whose certain denial common assent would be clearly and unhesitatingly given. Set 2 presents equally certain facts of well known fictional matters which few would bother to contest. Although these statements possess great certainty, their domain of certainty is restricted to fictional realms. Set 3 progresses to claims found in the domain of philosophy. Here we may start to feel some sense of unease in general about the level of certainty on account of an increase in subjectivity, ambiguity, and lack of consensus. I will expand on the reason for this sense of unease later. Set 4 presents statements regarding claims that rely on probability for their level of certainty. Although my sudden impending wealth on account of having the winning lottery ticket is very unlikely and hence equally uncertain, at least the probability can be calculated with a mathematical precision. In 5 we move to the realm of aphorisms. Some are so metaphorical that it's hard to pin down a precisely delineated meaning let alone certainty. Essentially, there is an uncertainty even of the level of certainty. Set 6 consists of "head-scratchers". These claims are clearly semantically challenged although syntactically sound. Note this set well, since it is on account of the syntactical coherence and validity that these statements possess, that they may give the appearance or form of asserting something meaningful. But this is an illusion which becomes apparent on closer semantic examination. Thus, certainty is not to be found here in any form. And finally, set 7 consists of claims about the truth of which we simply have to admit, if we value honesty at all, that we have no clue. This is often because we have no experience whatsoever of the domains of which these statements purport to speak, or even the possibility of such experience; thus, these claims possess certainty approaching as close to nil as we can get. But as with set 6, one must be vigilant, for such innocent sounding claims often appear to have a veneer of plausibility that covers up a core which we have to honestly admit speak of matters that no one really knows or can possibly know.
I think it would not be taken as far-fetched to say that people in general prefer greater certainty to the opposite in making decisions about matters that are consequential in their lives and in the lives of others in their spheres of influence. For instance, most would prefer to marry someone who they know reasonably well as opposed to taking a chance at a mail-order spouse, considering the long term commitment at risk. Not many would gladly entertain a career as a bomb disposal specialist, commodities trader, or chain saw juggler. We all want our banks to reassure us regarding the safety of our deposits and our doctors to provide assurance that the drugs they prescribe have been tested with the utmost care. We want to know that the pilots who fly the planes that whisk us to our vacations have the most thorough training and experience and that the planes themselves have been designed and thoroughly tested by highly qualified engineers. Judges rightly disallow tainted evidence, the more so in cases with serious potential consequences of punishment. But there is an arena of consideration where the consequences are of such immensity as to make those just mentioned wither and pale into less than insignificance in comparison; this is the consideration regarding the existence of God.
The unrivaled importance of this issue may come as a surprise to many who are, let's say, merely "recreational" believers. But clearly, this issue would not be considered to be on the same level with, say, the question of the existence of scorpions in the desert. For, consider what is at stake, at least with respect to the Abrahamic God. If the hypothesis that this God exists can be shown to be true, the implications are that an individual has the opportunity to form a relationship for all of eternity with a being of unimaginable power and munificence, who is, if nothing else, more than eager to accommodate. Nothing in our ordinary mundane existence, not even our wildest dreams of worldly fame and fortune, could approach comparison to such potential rewards. But it is not only the rewards, tantalising beyond imagination, of which we need to be aware. In contradistinction, we must also not forget the threats, the eternal unbearable torments awaiting those who worship the wrong god, fail to worship the right god with adequate enthusiasm, or fail to worship altogether. Consequently, it is of a level of importance commensurate with the degree of rewards and punishments that we get the issue of this being's existence just right! The examination of the question of the existence of the Abrahamic God deserves to be approached with the criterion of the most stringent warrant. We need to know that we are not barking up the wrong tree and possibly missing out on immeasurable rewards or, even worse, falling in with those who are condemned to eternal torment for making the wrong decision. After all, there are many other deities or variations even of the Abrahamic God waiting in the wings to snag our devotion. Can we afford to be cavalier and hope that, if whatever God exists, he will be kind to even casual devotees or those who decided to throw in with the wrong deity? That is a stretch if one pays any attention to the scriptures which are at the core and foundation of the Abrahamic beliefs.
Some may be willing to risk so much on such an attitude but I feel many would prefer greater assurance, that is, greater certainty. And once committed to the belief in this God's existence, there would be an expectation of the utmost urgency commensurate with the importance alluded to above, that one would expend a great deal of personal effort and dedication to gain the expected rewards. And this is, in fact, exactly what we see in the world today. Religious adherence and observance have a great hold on many people in countless significant ways and exact costs that profoundly and extensively impact the course and conduct of their lives and the lives of others in their sphere of influence. We see that, at the least, they give of their time attending services, performing rituals, and observing holidays. They commit emotionally to a great extent as evidenced by heated debates over religious differences or their reaction when their faith is perceived to be under siege from any quarter, especially unbelievers. They congregate and build religious organizations to which they lend considerable financial support. Certainly they give up some degree of their freedom and individuality, possibly to a great extent, as they defer to the influence and possibly whims and malice of clergy, and to outright charlatans in extreme cases. There may be notable effects on their speech as phrases like "God willing", "thank God ...", "blessed be his name" and so on and so forth become regular adornments to their utterances. They may choose their spouse(s) based on faith and rely on faith to tell them what activities they are allowed or compelled to engage in with their spouse(s). They may send their children to faith based schools, inculcate their children in their faith and steer them away from leaving their faith or entering other faiths. They may base their diets and perhaps their clothing and appearance on religious doctrine, possibly accept faith based influence in matters related to their health and the health of their families, and in matters related to their politics, and so on in endless significant ways. Most certainly it would impact their decisions in matters of morality even where it may contradict their common sense or their intuitive feelings. In some situations it may even be used to rationalize intuitively immoral behaviour on the ground that it is the will of God or God will forgive them anyway if they eventually repent. We must not forget the long term psychological effects of the ever present fear of divine retribution, now and in the afterlife, for misdeeds great and small, weakness of will, lapses in faith, and so on. This is magnified in intensity in children who would be even more terrified and emotionally scarred on account of the world view imposed on them by their parents and clergy. All this takes place to a lesser or greater extent depending on the devotion of the individual or at least the devotion the person would like to present for public display. Nor can we forget that such costs are imposed not merely in the short term but for the duration of a lifetime.
Inevitably, misfortunes of one sort or another visit even the most devout. In addition to the misfortune itself, religious adherence exacts an additional psychological toll. The devoted agonize over why God has abandoned them or why He repays their worship with suffering. What have they done to deserve it? The greater the misfortune, the greater is their mental torment in trying to keep their faith on an even keel. Not all survive such buffeting of fortune with their faith intact, and even so, the psychological scars of the battle often remain. We see how far reaching the impacts of religious devotion can be.
Invariably, these effects insinuate into culture and society as well as social policy, as we have tax exemptions if not outright government funding of faith based programs, we witness the deference to clergy and theologians in matters of ethics and possibly law, we see impacts of religious doctrine on policies regarding educational, medical, and scientific issues, right to life and right to death, and most perniciously in acts of abuse of privilege and in justifications for persecution, tribalism, war, oppression, and so on to a great extent. Again, these vary in degree from society to society but the breadth and depth is roughly correlated with the degree of religiosity in the society.
Such lists could be extended to book length and others have indeed performed that exercise. But I feel the case here is easily made and is patently evident, if sincerely examined, that religion has a broad and profound impact on the conduct of the lives of devoted individuals, their families and their society. Note well that I'm not implying a value judgement of the impact of religion. I'm claiming neither that this impact is for the good nor that it is for the bad. I'm merely pointing out its indisputable extent. If the case I have presented here strikes the reader as overstated, just perform, as honestly as possible, this thought experiment. Imagine to what extent the world would change, both personally and societally, if all religious devotion, in its entire extent, simply vanished overnight. I rest my case.
The preceding paragraphs have placed a great emphasis on the costs of religious devotion and little on the benefits. There is a reason for this. The costs are immediate, actual, and palpable. The benefits, at least those that are truly sublime and divinely promised to come in an afterlife, are merely potential and possible and somewhat vague on details, somewhat inconsistent. But above all, I need to stress here that the costs of religious devotion are not insignificant nor trivial as many may think on mere casual reflection. It is crucial to keep this realisation in mind for understanding the rest of my argument that is to follow.
In addition to this significant, immediate, and pervasive personal and societal investment that the devoted lay out on account of the expectation of the most sublime, but merely potential rewards, they also need to be aware of the obvious risk with which this is fraught. I'm not speaking of the potential that much of that effort is wrongly directed to a false deity, for there are many who at least profess that there really is only one God who is quite happy to receive the attention of devotees of all stripes. I don't feel it is worth contesting that view at this point. The far greater risk is the case where, having made such palpable investments, they get the decision of the existence of any God whatsoever entirely wrong! In that event, there are no rewards to be gained and only one precious lifetime of which to make the most without incurring significant needless and futile costs. In that case they are compelled to own up to the potential of an enormous waste of time and resources in the personal, familial, and societal spheres of the type I detailed above and to own up to the enormous harm and evil that may be done, in fact would be done, if history is any indicator, if they get it wrong. In the mildest case, they would have to contend with the distinctly unpleasant feeling of egg drooling down their face.
I feel that in the foregoing I have made a reasonable argument for the claim that, either way, whether God exists or not, the significance of that determination requires that the utmost care be brought to bear on its resolution. The consequences of error either way are too great. And just how may this care be attained? It may be done by applying the most stringent considerations to making the decision. Just as with any important decision in life such as marriage, health, finance, public safety, and so on, we need a great deal of certainty in the process of determination. This may be seen more clearly if I propose that we may use the toss of a coin to determine the God decision on the mathematical certainty--for a fair coin at least--that there is a 50/50 chance of getting it right. That's not bad at all! But most would no doubt agree that to rely on the toss of a coin in this situation would be considered reckless. The stakes are far too important either way. Such is the contrast between the two positions. A coin toss will simply not do!
At this point it would be advantageous to bring in some terms of clarification which will be used as touchstones of my thesis. Epistemology is the area of inquiry dealing with knowledge roughly in regard to its grounds, justification, and limits. It deals with what we know and how, and to what extent, we may be certain of that knowledge. This now harks back to the sets of assertions that I listed at the beginning. The certainty of these claims was seen to vary from unequivocal, all the way to virtually absent, and for a variety of reasons that were made clear. It may then be said of these claims that they possess some epistemic status in how they rank, high or low, as claims of knowledge. Or it may be said that they possess epistemic merit in the extent to which they engender confidence in their truth.
That water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at standard pressure has a very high epistemic status or, viewed another way, it has great epistemic merit, whereas claims about three-headed leprechauns and unicorns do not. That there are objective truths of morality has an epistemic status somewhere between the two extremes, precisely where depending on current philosophical consensus. That love is blind has a somewhat dubious epistemic status namely on account of its imprecision and metaphorical flavour, but it may be conceded to possess some broadly held germ of epistemic weight.
All this talk of epistemic status and epistemic merit has crucial relevance to the issue of making decisions such as those mentioned earlier. In order to make a decision about any matter whatever, one must weigh various considerations in support of one or the other side of the issue. But how are these considerations or, say, justifications to be judged and compared? We have seen that claims may come bearing all degrees of epistemic status. Any such claim may be used, indeed often is used, as justification for one or another side of an issue, say, the existence of God. More often than not, it is not readily apparent what the epistemic status of some claim is! But if it can be determined at all, with a little experience and some persistent analysis, then we can see just what degree of support is given by such a claim to its side of an issue. If a viewpoint is supported by assertions of high epistemic status, then we can feel confident in that viewpoint. If it is supported by nothing but assertions of low or dubious epistemic status, regardless of how many, then we can safely dismiss that viewpoint, at least provisionally until better justifications bearing greater epistemic merit come along.
Of course, assertions and justifications do not come accompanied by clear labels of epistemic status like nutritional disclosures on packaged food. It really is up to the individual, who is judging some argument, to practice due diligence and perform the verification and analysis needed to reduce the likelihood of being bamboozled. If the consequences of the decision based on the argument are significant enough, that should be enough motivation to practice due diligence to a commensurate degree. And it is often the case that some assertion may, on first impression, appear to bear greater epistemic status than it really merits. We will see examples of that later. There is no easy road to truth. The homework must be done and persistence must be practiced to the degree that the significance of the decision calls for. But I feel that the epistemic status of most assertions may be determined and the various sets of claims presented at the beginning offer a good rough guideline.
I had earlier alluded to this notion of significance in relation to making decisions. We consider significant those matters which have serious or potentially serious consequences, such as health, safety, long term commitments, familial obligations, financial matters, and of course the God decision. Such significance may be viewed as balanced between two particulars - cost and benefit. On closer scrutiny, we may consider benefits that are firm and actual or merely potential. That is, an actual benefit would be as certain as anything in this world to come about, whereas the level of certainty that a potential benefit may come about ranges anywhere from quite likely down to utterly unlikely. Let's focus on potential benefit as more appropriate in this context.
If both the actual cost and the potential benefit are low, so is the attendant significance and a decision one way or another elicits little concern. If the actual cost is high and the potential benefit low, the decision is simple; there is really no value here.
If the actual cost is low and the potential benefit high, then again the decision is quite simple and does not require agonizing examination or the justification of claims of great epistemic merit. With little to lose, it may be worth the risk. An example of this is my hypothetical winning lottery ticket earlier. These tickets are typically low in cost and my decision to buy just one is not such that I would agonize over it even considering that the epistemic merit of the statement, based on mathematical probability, that it is the winning ticket, is exceedingly low. To offset this low epistemic merit is the enticement of very significant potential benefit. As a further hypothetical example of low cost and great potential benefit that is related to the God decision, we may consider what would happen if the only act God required of us in order to be rewarded with eternal life and bliss is that on one single occasion in our lives we we would utter the name "Rumpelstiltskin" while dancing a jig. Notwithstanding the scant and subjective evidence for God's existence that so underpins the atheist's position on the matter, I would not be surprised to find that many atheists would still fulfill this simple requirement, although probably not in public. What's to lose in comparison to the enormous, even if only extremely remote likely gain? In fact, the contrast between the actual cost and the potential gain is so immense that it may be foolhardy not to incur the cost.
That leaves the final combination of great actual cost and great potential gain to consider. The God decision clearly falls into this category for the reasons I outlined earlier. I'm not going to get entangled in a discussion of Pascal's Wager [1]. which would seem to suggest itself here, since the need for that wager is premised on the hopelessness of using reason to make the God decision. I will be a bit more optimistic concerning the efficacy of reason and, moreover, my purpose is to shed light on how best to approach this question within the realm of reason. Of those who approach the matter of deciding on the existence of God, or of those who have already made the decision, many have been exposed to various longstanding arguments. And here is the kicker! Are those arguments supported by premises and assertions of epistemic merit that are commensurate with at least the cost of the decision?
We can see that this stringency becomes even more important in the context where the benefits, no matter how great, are merely potential and possess great uncertainty, as is the case in the question of the existence of God. After all, simply taking on the onerous actual costs of religious devotion as outlined in part I is no guarantee that the promised rewards will be gained. The devotee may have thrown in with the wrong sect, succumbed too often to temptation, was wrong or misled about the benefits that were purportedly promised by God, or, most significantly, was just outright wrong about the existence of God. But always, in contrast, the costs are nevertheless significant, actual and immediate. Accepting justifications of dubious epistemic merit in arguments to the existence of God in light of such certain costs and in light of such uncertain benefits would compare to betting the entire farm on a mere rumour of obtaining the map to mythical El Dorado [2].
Let's examine some actual arguments to the existence of God to see if they are indeed underpinned by justifications of adequate epistemic status. For this purpose I will cast the spotlight on a set of articles on the existence of God written by Dr. William Lane Craig, a well known and well respected theologian who holds double doctorates in philosophy and theology. He is widely considered to be a formidable debater on the topic of the existence of God. In one review of his book Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics one will find " ...He is simply the finest Christian apologist of the last half century and his academic work justifies ranking him among the top 1 percent of practicing philosophers in the Western world." [3] These are impressive credentials indeed which invites critical examination.
Craig has written a number of articles examining the issue of the existence of God over a stretch of three decades, many of which may be found at the website of Leadership U. [4] On reading these articles, one is struck by Craig's breadth of knowledge not only of philosophy but of science and mathematics, as well as logic. His arguments are expressed in a highly erudite, articulate and organized form and rely entirely on reason to convince the reader of his thesis. There are no appeals to blind faith and revelation here. In fact, his website itself is titled "Reasonable Faith" ! If anyone can symbolize the claim that belief in the existence of God is reasonable, rational, it is he. But do his arguments stand up under close scrutiny to the standard that I argued for above?
Before I dive into the examination of Craig's arguments, I would like to set the stage with a few prefatory remarks. Craig's arguments rely heavily on notions that are presented as philosophical verities. It now becomes appropriate to review the third set of statements whose epistemic status was considered earlier. Recall that I raised the concern that we may feel a sense of unease about some of the assertions in this set with respect to their epistemic status. But just how much unease should we feel and why? What in fact is the status of the domain of philosophy when it comes to elucidating the world about us in terms of assertions of suitable epistemic merit. Let's see how this question was viewed by some philosophers themselves.
"... to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy." [italics mine]
proclaimed Bertrand Russell.
William James opined,
"There is only one thing a philosopher can be relied upon to do, and that is to contradict other philosophers."
Ludwig Wittgenstein warned,
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, nor deduces anything . — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain." [italics mine]
and he further claimed,
"Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical."
But it was the philosopher Richard Rorty who really twisted the dagger in his book-long critical assessment of the enterprise of philosophy. In his work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty wrote,
"...the abandonment of the image of the Mirror leads us to abandon the notion of philosophy as a discipline which adjudicates the claims of science and religion, mathematics and poetry, reason and sentiment, allocating an appropriate place to each."
It is no wonder that the geneticist Steve Jones of University College London quipped,
" I often think that philosophy is to science as pornography is to sex, I mean it’s cheaper and easier and some people seem to prefer it." [5]
Of course, a few quotes taken out of context admittedly hardly amount to a conclusive argument. For lack of space, I am merely trying to raise the alarm that the curious may follow up on their own. But, for the time being, consider that if some of the brightest lights in the pantheon of philosophy themselves express such misgivings, we see that there is indeed some basis to our feeling of unease about the claims of philosophy in terms of epistemic merit. One would need to look far and wide to find among the many, often contradictory, speculative, and subjective claims of philosophy, assertions bearing epistemic merit comparable to that of the claim that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at standard pressure or the claim that the Earth's orbit is elliptical. Am I advancing the claim that philosophy should be dismissed as irrelevant and a waste of time? Not at all. The purpose of philosophy is a noble one. It is to act as the chaotic, fiery crucible out of which firm, hard sciences are eventually forged, as per Russell's observation. However, the point here is not to beat up on philosophy but to evaluate its epistemic status in its support of arguments.
Switching focus to the area of physics, itself noted for the highest epistemic status on account of its rigour, mathematical basis and fastidious standards of verification, there are no hypotheses that have greater certainty and acceptance than Quantum Mechanics and the Special and General Theories of Relativity. Both of these are as established in physics as any other foundational principles and have been verified not only directly in experiments to an astounding level of accuracy but by countless instances in the realm of application. Yet both these sets of principles are completely at odds with our native intuitive notions of space, time, and the locality and identity of matter. Quantum Mechanics tells us of particles that behave as if they were in more than one place at a time, arbitrarily pop in and out of existence from apparently nothing, exist in multiple states at the same time, somehow "know" when they are being observed, and so on. Relativity tells us of time itself passing at different rates in different frames of reference, space-time curving, light bending under gravity, meter sticks apparently shrinking yet still measuring accurately, and events that appear to be simultaneous to one observer, appearing at separate times to another, among many other strange things. All these phenomena are exceedingly and incomprehensibly strange by the light of our common sense and intuition, yet they are firmly shown to be intrinsic to the nature of the reality in which we exist.
Now the reason that our intuitions find QM and S/GTR so outlandish is that these phenomena don't manifest themselves to an easily observable level in our "middle world", that is, at spatial scales and velocities to which our common experience here on Earth is limited. Hence we never developed intuitions that take account of these strange realms and our intuitions simply cannot be taken as a good standard by which to judge the nature of reality, most especially in extreme realms of which we have no experience or no possibility of experience. Regarding claims pertinent to such realms, our intuitions exhibit little or no epistemic merit. In this light, re-examine the statements made in set 7 earlier.
I feel that we now have the basis from which we may profitably assess Craig's arguments for the existence of God. Clearly there is no space here to tackle each of his many articles in detail or even any single one of those that are grouped under the heading "Existence of God" at the Leadership U. website. But that is really not a problem because there is a manifest standard pattern and set of tactics that Craig uses repeatedly in all these articles and I will simply outline and assess these in light of my proffered standard. Then I especially encourage the reader to peruse any of Craig's articles at leisure and note if my assessments here ring true.
Craig's forte is the Kalam cosmological argument to the existence of God and this may be noted when reading most of his articles. Even if some of these articles may not mention Kalam by name, it becomes clear that the argument is pertinent to some feature of the Kalam argument. Here is the Kalam argument outline in its simplest form:
Now one may rightly wonder that if this argument is purported to be about the existence of God, as the context of these articles suggests, why is there no mention of God in the argument outline? Is one to assume that by the sheer force of the conclusion 3, ipso facto God exists? To any person of reason, this would clearly require a monumental leap across a profoundly yawning chasm, since all the argument claims to have established is that the universe has a cause, and stops dead right there. And since the argument provides nothing more to work with, what would be the traits of this God entailed by nothing more than the acceptance of statement 3 ? Could we deduce that this God created the world in six days, took a rest, created humans, has certain personal expectations, laid down particular laws, flooded the world, spawned a son, is concerned about our sexual escapades, promises eternal life and bliss to the devoted select, and so on? These are the really important questions when it comes to the issue of devotion to God, and the Kalam argument presented by Craig is entirely silent on all this! His Kalam argument entirely fails, in fact does not even attempt, to connect the dots between statement 3 and the God that we seek.
Except for a few brief attempts with respect to something that Craig refers to by the moniker "God", whose traits Craig also leaves largely enigmatic with respect to the important ones I just listed, he curiously focuses the vast majority of his effort in these articles in simply attempting to arrive at the conclusion of statement 3. But of course, this is almost trivial; were it not for the fact that we're expecting these arguments, on account of the context, to be about the existence of God, the Kalam argument as framed here, could be taken as a mere philosophical exercise or perhaps a search for some truth of cosmology. To view it another way, consider a theater critic who devotes all of his lengthy review in detailing the trials and tribulations in getting to the theater and finding his seat, followed only by a brief, single sentence remarking that, by the way, he enjoyed the show; not very edifying and entirely unfulfilling in terms of what is actually expected of the situation.
If we're looking to examine the epistemic status of the arguments that Craig presents to the existence of God as most commonly construe Him to be, we appear to be left empty handed. In an overview of all these articles, even a mere hint of God barely makes an appearance. At this level, even accepting the conclusion of statement 3 hardly appears to provide warrant to incurring the costs of religious devotion that I outlined earlier. This is not to mention that statement 3 makes no claims whatever regarding the benefits to be expected as a result of incurring such costs.
Since Craig expends such efforts in attempting to attain statement 3, let's at least give him the benefit of the doubt and examine how well he fares even in this matter. Again we note a clear pattern here among the articles. These articles turn out to be less about making a clear and unassailable case for the Kalam argument as much as they are reviews and defences that attempt to fend off contrary opinions that have been expressed by others regarding this line of argument. Here Craig is really in his element and this offers him a wonderful opportunity to weigh in on abstruse matters both philosophical and cosmological. His erudition shines and I suspect many readers are very impressed, especially if they don't pay too close attention to the reasoning -- they are not entirely to blame since the reasoning sometimes approaches Gordian perplexity. But on sober reflection, one must note that expending effort largely on fending off salvos from others, regardless of how sophisticated and clever in form, does not add one iota to the truth of the positive assertion of the Kalam argument. All Craig can claim, at best, is that he has shown that others have failed to falsify the Kalam argument. This is not even to say that, in fact, Craig does successfully fend off all the attacks; on the further examination of his methods below, we will see why. Still, the far more convincing approach for a skeptic who is looking for arguments of high epistemic status, would be to focus on establishing the Kalam argument supported by justifications of high epistemic status rather than assume that, having mounted a valiant defense, what is defended is true.
Well, Craig does intersperse his defensive arguments with some effort in this direction, essentially in support of premise 1 and 2. What nature of justification does he offer for these? Whereas he gladly delves into esoteric matters in mathematics, physics, and cosmology in order to fend off attacks against the Kalam argument, he largely justifies premises 1 and 2 by nebulous philosophical means. We regularly find justifications such as "metaphysical intuition", "metaphysically possible" "plausible", "intuitively obvious" and other terms deploying the distinctly philosophical modifier, "metaphysical", for which Craig appears to demonstrate an extraordinary fondness. For instance, in justifying premise 1, he states, "The principle that something cannot come out of absolutely nothing strikes me as a sort of metaphysical first principle, one of the most obvious truths we intuit when we reflect philosophically." [6] Or we see, "The problem with saying that the Big Bang is an event without a cause is that it entails that the universe came into being uncaused out of nothing, which seems metaphysically absurd." [7] There are clearly two problems here in light of my earlier prefatory remarks. One needs to be concerned about the epistemic status of nebulous philosophical principles, as applied to precise cosmological questions such as the beginning of the universe. And Craig wishes to present the assumption of the beginning of the universe as falling under the domain of premise 1. One needs to be equally concerned about our intuitions regarding events, such as the purported birth of the universe, that are extremely far afield to our local experiences. My remarks earlier on our native intuitions, metaphysical or not, vis-a-vis Quantum Mechanics and Relativity, should stand as ample warning not to grant much epistemic status to such intuitions.
Premise 2 fares no better. It is often justified by Craig on the ground that an actual infinity, such as an infinite stretch of time, cannot exist. The notion of "actual infinity", that is a completed totality, is itself steeped in no more than ancient philosophy (due to Aristotle). But moreover, the difficulty in accepting Craig's claim arises from the semantics of the term "exist" itself. Existence is a function of time since something may exist at some time -- the Earth for instance -- but not at other times. So the term "existence" semantically represents a notion that takes place within time itself. This now raises a confounding circularity if we try to consider in what sense an actual infinity of instances of time can be considered to exist! If time itself is the "container" for other existing things, in what "container" would a set, finite or infinite, of instances of time "exist"? We need to admit that we have run into a semantic limit of the term "exist" which cannot be applied to time in any way that makes sense. In other words, we have an instance of a type 6 assertion which we have earlier noted possesses scant epistemic status!
Craig continues to tread nebulous philosophical waters with premise 2, but even there he is ignoring warnings from a figure no less than Immanuel Kant. Kant recognized that the question of time raises an antinomy in that, using pure reason alone, we can deduce both the thesis that there was a beginning to the universe and equally the antithesis that there was no beginning to the universe, simply by showing that the opposite appears false in each case. Kant warned that this antinomy is irresolvable by pure reason. But Craig still keeps trying to prop up the thesis part of Kant's antinomy while selectively ignoring the antithesis as well as Kant's warning. This situation is much like an inventor who persists in working on a perpetual motion machine notwithstanding clear demonstrations of the first law of thermodynamics.
We will also note Craig's penchant for endless citations in his arguments. On the surface, this may appear impressive both from the perspective of meticulous research and scholarship as well as the apparent support for his assertions. This undoubtedly presents a definite appearance of firm epistemic status to Craig's arguments which these citations are proffered to support! However, when the citations often refer to other theologians or philosophers with leanings similar to Craig, such as Alvin Plantinga or Richard Swinburne, this hardly constitutes convincing, unbiased support in the eyes of the skeptic. It merely confirms the uninteresting and trivial truth of the matter that Craig is not alone in his world view. We must also not lose sight of the fact that the citations are largely presented merely as support for statement 3 of the Kalam argument, and not as support for the entailment from that statement to the existence of God as most fully envision Him.
Why does Craig rely so heavily on philosophy and intuition to prop up premises 1 and 2 when he is clearly knowledgeable about physics and cosmology? It is simply because physics has nothing substantial to say on the matter. The Big Bang lies behind a veil of time in the youth of the universe from which no direct observation is available since light did not penetrate the largely homogeneous gaseous matter prevalent at that time. Physical laws, as we currently know them, break down at the time of the Big Bang. So this whole event, and what if anything preceded it, is still a scientific mystery, although theories abound. But they are unsupported currently by firm evidence. Craig really only has metaphysical intuition to go on! But is metaphysical intuition enough for this exceedingly important issue? Craig would think so. He writes, "... in order to qualify as a successful piece of natural theology an argument need not consist of premises which are undeniably true, or clearly true, or even plausibly true, but of premises which are merely more plausibly true than their contradictories." [8]
Aside from the patent difficulty in accurately establishing, in a comparative manner, some plausibility, a distinctly nebulous and specious quality, this whole self-serving criterion for the success of arguments of natural theology sets the bar so ludicrously low that an ant would trip over it. Given such a virtual non-standard, any naked emperor may be presented as clothed in the finest raiment. As I earlier stressed, we really need to set the bar with the utmost stringency considering the great stakes at issue here. And if it is countered that at least this criterion for successful arguments of natural theology will more likely place us on the correct side, more often than not, then consider the worrisome situation where the premise and its contradictory are both ill conceived in the first place. This not uncommon situation, better known as a false dichotomy, is often seen in argumentation. The well known example of the contradictories, "either you have stopped beating your wife or you have not stopped beating your wife" highlights the danger of accepting such a toothless criterion for natural theology.
Let's examine the consequences of using intuition and the low bar set for natural theology by looking at a more mundane context of everyday life rather than the issue of the existence of God. How reassuring would it be for someone to be told the following:
If accepting these statements appears ludicrous regarding everyday matters, why would we be expected to accept similar justifications regarding an issue as important to the conduct of life as the existence of God?
Finally, let's examine the nature of Craig's argument in the rare instance where he actually faces up to the real question of how the Kalam argument entails the existence of God [7]. To pick up the thread, he feels he has shown that a natural cause of the universe out of nothing is untenable and, "...we are therefore driven to the second alternative: a supernatural agency beyond space and time." Let's overlook the possibility of false dichotomy for the moment and see where Craig goes with this. He continues further, "If we go the route of postulating some causal agency beyond space and time as being responsible for the origin of the universe, then conceptual analysis enables us to recover a number of striking properties which must be possessed by such an ultra-mundane being." Note well that even having assumed success at the Kalam argument, Craig feels he can only postulate the causal agency beyond space and time, not demonstrate it. Again, we will overlook this rather timid offer of an implied God, the causal agency, to see what ensues as a result of the postulation.
Had I not brought attention to the problems facing those assertions in set 7 in the beginning, these assertions by Craig may slip under the radar of an inattentive reader. A whole slew of assumptions, that neither Craig nor anyone else on this planet has any clue about, are being casually slipped into the argument in an offhand manner. We are creatures immovably embedded in space and time and that is all we know about and all we can even intuit. We simply have no clue nor possess the cognitive mechanisms to contemplate if there even is a "region" of some sort that may be considered in some way to be "beyond" space and time or even if such a thing is a meaningful concept, since no one has truthfully experienced it or can experience it. We can theorize lesser or greater spatial and temporal dimensions as mathematical hypotheses since these are still of a nature with our space and time. But to toss out all such dimensions and still pretend that it's something similar to what we have experience with is no less than the wildest ungrounded speculation and fantasy. We can't even imagine such a "region" nor what it means for it to "exist" and what it means for something to "exist" "in" such a "region". We can't say that it makes any sense to claim the existence of "agency" in this "region", let alone one that is "supernatural", since we have no clue what "natural" or "causal" means "there" if anything. We most certainly could not claim to "... recover a number of striking properties which must be possessed by such an ultra-mundane being," since again, all of these terms such as "properties", "possess", and "being" are space-time terms. That is all we know of and to baldly extrapolate these to some unimaginable "region" "beyond" space and time is audacious without par. Note even the difficulty of using words here, which I am forced to place in quotes, since these words are inexorably anchored by the notions of our language and cognitive faculties in space and time. Even the phrase "beyond space and time" perforce needs to rely on a spatial preposition! There are no appropriate words for this notion that are, explicitly or implicitly, neither spatial nor temporal.
I cannot over-emphasize the massive blunder in reasoning that language can deceptively lead us into. As shown in set 6 earlier, it is the simplest matter to put words together in a syntactically correct manner such that the statements appear to speak of meaningful states of affairs of which we are deceived that we can make judgements. Hence we can easily speak of triangles with four vertices, happily married bachelors who dwell north of the North Pole, and realms beyond time and space. But we need to recognize that these matters speak only of linguistic illusions of which no rational true judgements may be made since we have no possible experience of them at all. This summarizes Craig's attempt to reason about "... some causal agency beyond space and time." Not even his beloved metaphysical intuitions can come to his aid here!
He continues in the same vein about what "properties" and "attributes" this "atemporal" and "non-spatial" "being" would "possess", entirely oblivious to how impossible this is to speculate about. It is then needless to continue this part of the critique further since the rest of Craig's argument continues hindered by the same insuperable impediments. Relying entirely on such untenable blatant speculations and unrealisable extrapolations, Craig has failed to demonstrate God, such as most people construe Him, as the cause of the universe, since he slipped into the type of assertions in set 6 and 7 which we have earlier seen to have essentially null epistemic merit. Wittgenstein was painfully aware of the dangers of such rampant extrapolation when he wrote, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." [9]
The astute reader of Craig's articles will eventually realize that there is no God to be found there, at least of the type most would normally construe as God in the fullness of all his commonly held attributes, even though the articles are presented as arguing to the existence of God. This type of fault is actually common to all standard arguments for God, in that they focus on one narrow aspect of God to explain what we see; none actually argue for a full God and none of the arguments can be seamlessly joined to each other to demonstrate a full God. This brings us back full circle to the burning question of the God decision that I laid out at the start. If Dr. Craig, with his patent erudition, breadth of knowledge, and fast adherence to reason, in form at least if not in substance, apparently fails to present arguments to God founded on assertions of high epistemic merit, despite a great number of articles devoted to that purpose over many years, is there much hope for the decision regarding the existence of God to meet the stringent standard which I claim deserves to be applied? I leave that for the reader to explore and urge further investigation in Craig's writings and in the writings of others.
I hope that I have made clear some tools and standards of reason and analysis that are indispensable in this quest. But above all, the seeker must consistently and uncompromisingly apply the highest criterion of epistemic merit that must be met by any argument for the existence of God, considering that there really is a great immediate and actual personal and societal cost to be paid as a consequence of the wrong decision.
[1] Hájek, Alan, "Pascal's Wager", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
[2] A mythical "Lost City of Gold" believed to be located in South America.
[3] J.P. Moreland, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology.
[4]
Leadership U, Writings from William Lane Craig on the Existence of God.
[5]
Interview with Steve Jones on The Science Show, ABC Radio National
[6] William Lane Craig,
God and the Initial Cosmological Singularity: A Reply to Quentin Smith.
[7] William Lane Craig,
The Ultimate Question of Origins: God and the Beginning of the Universe
[8] William Lane Craig,
Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder
[9] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
© 2010 by G. Czobel